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On 14 December 2017, the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute of the
International Criminal Court adopted Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5,1 and thereby
activated the Court’s jurisdiction over the crime of aggression. This decision posit-
ively transmitted the Nuremberg legacy on the crime against peace to a twenty-first
century setting. Not without compromises though. The irony that the four states
which enabledNurembergback in1946werenowarduously avoiding the extension
of theCourt’s jurisdiction over the crimeof aggressionhas not goneunnoticed.2 The
trajectoryof thecrimeofaggression, thecompromises, the technicalities, thepolitics
and the sentiments are authoritatively recorded in theCrime of Aggression Library ∗∗∗
The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary, Volumes 1 and 2. This two-volume work has
been composed and edited by two patrons of the Crime of Aggression, namely Claus
Kress and Stefan Barriga, the scholar and the diplomat. Both editors have in their
respective capacity indefatigably striven for the creation of a robust accountability
regime for the illegal use of force. The two tomes that they have put together are, in
a way, further proof of their dedication to this ambitious undertaking. This is not to
say that all chapters are unequivocally supportive of the core idea of criminalizing
aggressionwithwidepotential for ICC jurisdiction.On the contrary, the book is very
rich in perspective. In its five parts on (i) history; (ii) theory; (iii) the crime of aggres-
sionundercurrent international law; (iv)national law;and(v) the futureworldorder,
this work assembles opposite opinions and it offers an enormously wide variety of
understandings and views, marrying also more legal-technical accounts with the
philosophical, the political and the historical. Given that many authors of various
chapters have participated at some point in the legal development of the crime of
aggression, the work is also an addendum to the travaux pre´paratoires compiled by
1 Resolution ICC-ASP/16/Res.5, adopted at the 13th plenary meeting, 14 December 2017.
2 J. Trahan, ‘One Step Forward for International Criminal Law; One Step Backwards for Jurisdiction’, Opinio
Juris, 16 December 2017.
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the same editors in 2011,3 with authors putting on record their understanding of
what was agreed by a certain text and explaining the negotiating context.4 Many of
the chapters will provide guidance to the Court and to other international actors on
the intricacies of key legal issues of the Kampala arrangements and the activation
decision, and their relation to the ICC Statute and to general international law. Yet,
the significance of this work stretchesmuch beyond these important contributions
to doctrinal debates, as thewritings grapplewith foundational inquiries that under-
lie the criminalization of aggression. Part V considers how aggression prosecutions
may shape our future world order. The theme of how Article 8bis of the ICC Statute
affects the jus contra bellum is obviously present throughout. The ambivalent role
of the human rights community towards the project of criminalizing aggression is
alsodiscussed invarious chapters, as are the costs andconsequencesof compromises
made during the negotiations.
The origins of the idea of a crime of aggression and its relation to a nascent jus
contra bellum in the interbellum and the post-SecondWorldWar decolonization era
are very eloquently presented in the first chapters of part I on history by some of the
most prominent authors on aggression and the crime against peace, namely Sellars,
McDougall and Bruha.5 Defining the precedential value and legacy of Nuremberg
andTokyo, Sellars andMcDougall agree that the immediate post-SecondWorldWar
jurisprudencewillbeof limited interpretive significance for ICC judgesgivenArticle
8bis’ manifest-requirement which had no equivalent in, then, relevant definitions
of crimes against peace.6 Sellars explains how the respective dissenting opinions
of both Pal and Ro¨ling flourished in early Cold War discussions and she, thus, also
sets the stage for Bruha’s chapter on the making of UN GA Resolution 3314 (XXIX)
on the Crime of Aggression. Introducing Resolution 3314 as a political document
and highlighting its inherent ambiguities, Bruha indicates that sincere doubts are
justified on the normative link that was created between that Resolution and the
Kampala definition, although he does not pursue the point, being confronted with
a fait accompli that may well constitute the very core of the Kampala compromise.7
Moving away from the General Assembly and its (limited) contribution to defining
aggression through Resolution 3314, Strapatsas details the practice of the Security
Council regarding the concept of aggression, meticulously analyzing past and po-
tential new practice and how this could or should inform future ICC proceedings.8
3 S. Barriga and C. Kress, The Travaux Pre´paratoires of the Crime of Aggression (2011).
4 See, e.g., on the discussion of applying the attempt provision of Art. 25(3)(f) of the ICC Statute to the crime
of aggression and how this discussion was intertwined with or distorted by discussions on the role of the
Security Council, R. Clark, ‘General Principles of International Criminal Law’, in C. Kress and S. Barriga
(eds.), The Crime of Aggression: A Commentary (2017), 615. See also, at 618, where Clark explains that ‘as one
of those involved in the drafting of the Elements, I did not see Element 3 as addressed at all to the question
of attempts’.
5 K. Sellars, ‘The First World War, Wilhelm II and Article 227: The Origin of the Idea of “Aggression” in
International Criminal Law’ (Ch. 1); C. McDougall, ‘The Crime against Peace Precedent’ (Ch. 2); K. Sellars,
‘The Legacy of the Tokyo Dissents on “Crimes against Peace” (Ch. 3); T. Bruha, ‘The General Assembly’s
Definition of the Act of Aggression’ (Ch. 4).
6 Ibid., at 77 and 105.
7 Ibid., at 173.
8 N. Strapatsas, ‘The Practice of the Security Council Regarding the Concept of Aggression’ (Ch. 5).
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The relationship between the Security Council and the ICC, and the possibility of
the ICC to proceed without Security Council approval, obviously one the greatest
breakthroughs of Kampala, gets excellent treatment in the chapters by Barriga and
Blokker.9 The interrelationship between the Kampala crime of aggression and the
jus contra bellummore generally is also discussed by Akande and Tzanakopoulos in
their chapter on the ICJ and the concept of aggression.10 The two authors try to
make sense of the plethora of rules and concepts (illegal use of force, armed attack,
act/war/crime of aggression) and arrive at the conclusion that there are two sets
of concepts based on different degrees of gravity, one for the exclusive purposes of
state responsibility and one serving both purposes of state responsibility as well
as individual criminal responsibility. The two sets do not necessarily correspond
except for the concepts of ‘armed attack’ and ‘act of aggression’ which, according
to the authors, can be equated.11 This all makes for a very complex whole, and this
complexity does not per se reinforce the robustness of the jus contra bellum.After all,
only legal scholars may truly enjoy the many shades of grey while ultimately the
added complexity of Kampala might detract from the clarity of the primary norm.
In his pie`ce de re´sistance – the chapter on state conduct, which is actually an excellent
treatise on the use of force and could be a monograph as such – Kress pursues the
analysis into jus contra bellum. He offers in-depth discussion of the grey areas, includ-
ing humanitarian intervention and pre-emptive self-defence, whichwillmostly fall
outside the scope of Article 8bis because of the provision’s threshold requirement
that violations of the UN Charter be manifest.12 The requirement, and Article 8bis
more broadly, is extensively discussed, and criticized by other authors in the book
for being indeterminate.13 In defence of the requirement, Koskenniemi, instead,
states in his chapter that it is not the indeterminacy of the language or the norm of
Article 8biswhich is problematic, but rather the indeterminacy, or vagueness, of the
world itself. Since the futurewill never be like the past, there is a need for evaluative
standards, such as themanifest-clause, rather than ‘idiot rules’.14 Elsewhere, the con-
trary argument has also been made that the differentiation between criminal and
non-criminal uses of force may well result in an actual derogation of the compre-
hensive prohibition of the use of force,making ordinary violations of lesser concern
because they are not criminalized.15 Article 2(4) as jus cogens, andKampala’s crimeof
aggression as some sort ofmagna jus cogens. Seen from this perspective, the question
whether Article 8bis of the ICC Statute may inadvertently devalue Article 2(4) is
not necessarily unjustified. And it is a tremendously important question given the
prevailing climate of excessive invocationof the right to self-defence as inOperation
9 S. Barriga and N. Blokker, ‘Entry into Force and Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction: Cross-Cutting
Issues’ (Ch. 17) and ‘Conditions for the Exercise of Jurisdiction based on Security Council Referrals’ (Ch. 18).
10 D. Akande and A. Tzanakopoulos, ‘The International Court of Justice and the Concept of Aggression’ (Ch. 6).
11 Ibid., at 229.
12 C. Kress, ‘The State Conduct Element’ (Ch. 14).
13 See, e.g., McDougall, ‘Article 8bis papers over rather than resolved debates on the contours of prohibition of
use of force’; C. McDougall, ‘The Crime against Peace Precedent’, in Kress and Barriga, supra note 4, cf fn. 5, at
125.
14 M. Koskenniemi, ‘A Trap for the Innocent . . . ’ (Ch. 49).
15 A. Paulus, ‘Second thoughts on aggression’, (2009) 20 EJIL 1117–28, at 1124.
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Olive Branch,16 the latest USNuclear Strategy stating that theUSmay retaliatewith
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear attacks,17 and discussions over a bloody-nose
strike against North Korea by the US.18 Obviously, views on the core question of
how best to move towards a robust jus contra bellum differ, and it was the editors’
explicit ambition to capture the full panoply of voices and policy views rather than
to merely convey their own or majority perspectives.19 The different actors’ views
set out in Part V fully live up to this ambition, as they include perspectives from all
P5 countries, but also Israel, Iran, Japan, South Korea, India, Egypt, Brazil and South
Africa.20
Weisbord’s chapter on the perspective and role of civil society makes for a very
interesting read as it dissects the ‘faltering of civil society’ in the lead-up to Kampala
in strongcontrast to civil society’snotable forceandsuccessesduring theadoptionof
theRomeStatute.21 Echoing critiques also expressed in the contributions of Schabas
and Me´gret, Weisbord sets out the different problems that NGOs have with the
idea of a crime of aggression. Going one layer deeper, Schabas explores the roots
of the human right to peace and makes the case that this notion could act as a
unifying principle bringing human rights law, international humanitarian law and
international criminal justice closer together, thereby countering the militaristic
tendency in which the human rights movement has engaged by supporting the
concepts of humanitarian intervention and responsibility to protect.22 In a similar
vein, Me´gret traces the failure of the human rights movement to speak out on
aggression back to human rights law’s deference to international humanitarian
law.23 He suggests, instead, that international human rights law should reconstruct
itself andno longer seewarasan impenetrableblackbox.24 It shouldreconceptualize
its relationshipwith international humanitarian law,whichwouldpave theway for
theunderstandingthat thespecificevilofaggression isnot that it attackssovereignty
or threatens peace, but – in Me´gret’s view – aggression should be seen as a crime
16 A. Peters, ‘The Turkish Operation in Afrin (Syria) and the Silence of the Lambs’, EJIL: Talk!, 30 January 2018,
available at www.ejiltalk.org/?s=silence+of+the+lambs.
17 2018 Nuclear Posture Review, Department of Defence, US, February 2018, at 21: ‘The United States would
only consider the employment of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests
of the United States, its allies, and partners. Extreme circumstances could include significant non-nuclear strategic
attacks. Significant non-nuclear strategic attacks include, but are not limited to, attacks on the U.S., allied,
or partner civilian population or infrastructure, and attacks on U.S. or allied nuclear forces, their command
and control, or warning and attack assessment capabilities’ (emphasis added).
18 The idea of a pre-emptive, limited attack on North Korean nuclear missile arsenal and infrastructure, also
called the bloody nose option was considered by Trump in February 2018. Defense Minister Mattis warned
that war with North Korea would be ‘catastrophic’ – ‘probably the worst kind of fighting in most people’s
lifetimes’,New York Times, 3–4 February 2018, at 5 (‘White House presses for new options on North Korea’).
19 C. Kress, ‘Introduction: The Crime of Aggression and the International Legal Order’, in Kress and Barriga,
supra note 4, at 7, footnote 34.
20 In the order of the chapters 33–47: M. Biato and M. Bo¨hlke, Brazil; Zhou Lulu, China; E. Belliard, France; S.
Wasum-Rainer, Germany; N. Singh, India; Djamchid Momtaz and E. Baghaei Hamaneh, Iran; R.S. Scho¨ndorf
andD.Geron, Israel; I. Komatsu, Japan; Y. SokKim, SouthKorea; R. Einar Fife,Norway;G.Kuzminand I. Panin,
Russia; A. Stemmet, South Africa; C.Whomersley, UK; H.H. Koh and T.F. Buchwald, US; N. Negm, Egypt.
21 N.Weisbord, ‘Civil Society’ (Ch. 48).
22 W. Schabas, ‘Aggression and International Human Rights Law’ (Ch. 12).
23 F. Me´gret, ‘What is the Specific Evil of Aggression?’ (Ch. 51), see also specifically at 1425.
24 Ibid., at 1434.
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againsthumanity.25 Pursuant to thisargument, aggressionengages thehumanrights
responsibility of the aggressor state for the entirety of its human rights impact
including impact emanating from the counter-violence committed by the state
acting in self-defence. In this sense, the ultimate evil of aggression is that it makes
violence legal because of the application of the laws of war. Me´gret does not believe
that the contradiction of behaviour being legal under one regime (laws of war)
and illegal under the other (human rights) should necessarily be fatal.26 Me´gret’s
thinking is certainly refreshing andprovocative. Thequestionof theprotectedvalue
of aggression andwhether this should be framed in human rights terms rather than
sovereignty or loss of territory is a recurring theme which is also analyzed in other
chapters, particularly the chapter by May, Kress’ introductory piece and, from a
historical perspective, Sellars’ chapter.27
These reflections of a more philosophical nature may also inform very technical
queries thatwere leftunregulated inKampala.Oneexampleconcerns thequestionof
victimparticipationandreparations. Inamost illuminatingchapter,Pobjiediscusses
how the victimprovisions of the ICCStatute should apply to the crimeof aggression
with a specific focus on the question how harm should be interpreted in a case of
aggression, and what kind of nexus should exist between harm suffered and the
crime of aggression. This inevitably evokes questions of protected interest. Pursuing
Me´gret’s lineof thought, Pobjie discusses thepotential of civil liability for individual
perpetrators of aggression forharmcausedby lawful acts ofwar, placing the analysis
in the context of broader developments regarding possibly emerging procedural
rights of individuals to reparation for jus contra bellum violations.28 Obviously, the
universe of victims is potentially massive. And even more so if states as victims of
aggression are included, although it is not necessarily clear what states would gain
from such a victim status in the ICC context, in addition to the procedural rights
that already exist under general international law.
Another matter left unregulated in Kampala and a clear result of compromise
concerns the role of the Pre-Trial Division. This administrative unit was given a
judicial function in aggression proceedings without much deeper consideration of
how such a regime would operate in practice. There is a question of composition as
pre-trial divisions are currently composed of five, six or seven judges for aminimum
period of three years and this number may even fluctuate within this three-year
period. In addition to the inherent problem of a judicial organ being so flexibly
composed, rules of decision-making – majority or unanimity – have also not been
specified. The special authorizationproceduremayalso affect the interplaybetween
investigations into different crimes based on similar facts as the additional filters for
aggression proceedings may result in a different pace for aggression investigations
than for investigation into other Article 5 crimes which are subject to a different
authorizationscheme, thusrequiringsomekindof two-trackinvestigatoryapproach
25 Ibid., at 1445.
26 Ibid., at 1437.
27 L. May, ‘JustWar Theory and the Crime of Aggression’ (Ch. 9). See also references in footnote 5 and 20.
28 E. Pobjie, ‘Victims of the Crime of Aggression’ (Ch. 23).
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by the Prosecutor. These questions are discussed in the outstanding chapter by
Chaitidou, Eckelmans and Roche on the Pre-Trial Division.29 These are detailed
procedural and institutional questions that may seem overly technical, but if the
crime of aggression is to become operative, they are ultimately as essential as the
deep philosophical queries and the political considerations.
It is the great merit of this book to bring all those different issues together,
and to do so in such an impressive fashion. The two magnificent volumes, rich in
perspective and thorough in analysis, are therefore without any doubt among the
most authoritative works on the crime of aggression.
Larissa van den Herik∗
29 E. Chaitidou, F. Eckelmans and B. Roche, ‘The Judicial Function of the Pre-Trial Division’ (Ch. 22).
∗ Vice Dean of Leiden Law School and Professor of Public International Law at the Grotius Centre for Interna-
tional Legal Studies, Leiden University [L.van.den.Herik@LAW.leidenuniv.nl].
1 See, for instance, the project carried out by the ICRC and Switzerland on how to enhance compli-
ance in armed conflicts, available at www.icrc.org/en/document/strengthening-compliance-international-
humanitarian-law-ihl-work-icrc-and-swiss-government (accessed 16 March 2018). For other studies on the
topic, see the Generating Respect for the Law issue of the International Review of the Red Cross pub-
lished in December 2015, (2014) 95/96 International Review of the Red Cross 684; and ICRC, ‘Improv-
ing Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International Armed Conflicts’, 2008, avail-
able at www.icrc.org/sites/default/files/topic/file_plus_list/0923-increasing_respect_for_international_
humanitarian_law_in_non-international_armed_conflicts.pdf (accessed 16March 2018).
2 E. Heffes and M. Kotlik, ‘Special agreements as a means of enhancing compliance with IHL in non-
international armedconflicts:An inquiry into thegoverning legal regime’, (2014) 96 InternationalReviewof the
Red Cross 1201. See also ICRC, Improving Respect for International Humanitarian Law in Non-International
Armed Conflicts, supra note 1, at 11–12.
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